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ABSTRACT 
(This paper comprises approximately 15 200 words, excluding its table of 
contents, footnotes and references.) 
The paper examines New Zealand's approach to the compulsory 
treatment of the mentally ill and focuses on the rights of patients set out in 
Part VI of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992. The paper also examines: 
(a) the "central dilemma" in mental health legislation: balancing the 
rights of patients with the need for compulsory treatment; 
(b) the duties which exist in the 1992 Act which impose an obligation 
to provide patients with their rights; 
(c) the mechanisms available to patients to ensure that their rights are 
respected; 
( d) the need to provide patients with assistance if they are to take 
advantage of their rights; and 
( e) the barriers which may prevent patient's being granted their rights. 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's most recent mental health law reform commenced in 1982. 
In 1982 the Department of Health established a working party tasked to 
revise the Mental Health Act 1969. This law reform process culminated 
with the enactment (on 15 June 1992) of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 ("the 1992 Act"). 
The long title of the 1992 Act provides that this is -
An Act to re-define the circumstances in which and the conditions under which persons 
may be subjected to compulsory assessment and treatment, to define the rights of 
such persons and to provide better protection for those rights, and generally to 
reform and consolidate the law relating to the assessment and treatment of persons 
suffering from mental disorder. 
(Emphasis added). The 1992 Act can be seen as an attempt to overhaul 
mental health law in New Zealand. 
In drafting the 1992 Act the legislature faced three problems. 
1. The difficulty of providing legal safeguards for individual liberty 
where compulsory power is being exercised on the basis of 
predictions of future conduct and the prognosis of likely illness. 
2. The difficulty of how to deal with the need for compulsory treatment 
(particularly where such treatment requires the patient to be 
"detained' as an in-patient) while at the same time maintaining the 
patients sense of autonomy and freedom which is important to the 
therapeutic response and the therapeutic alliance. 
3. The difficulty of balancing the patient's right to individual liberty 
with the rights of the community. 
This paper focuses on the second and third of these problems. 
The paper also considers: 
(a) the barriers which exist to prevent patients making use of their 
rights; and 
5 
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(b) the need to provide patients, because of the nature of their 
condition, with assistance to take advantage of their rights. 
MENTAL HEAL TH AND MENTAL HEAL TH ACTS 
What is Mental Health? 
The 1992 Act does not define the terms "mental health" or "mental 
illness". 1 
Mason Durie (1984) points out that the term "mental health" is hard to 
define, and it is easy to confuse the terms mental health, mental illness 
and psychiatry.2 
Durie cites Roberts (1969)3 who suggests that abstract conceptual models 
of mental health are probably less helpful than those models which seek 
to obtain an appreciation of "what is mental health" by focusing on the 
reality in which we live. In other words our conceptions of "what is mental 
health" is bound by time and culture. 
2 
3 
A Department of Health discussion paper on the definition of the term mental disorder (anon) points out 
that the terms "mental health" and "mental illness" are not defined in the Bill which became the 1992 Act. 
The paper points out that, this omission was deliberate, and has considerable value in terms of flexibility. 
The paper recognises that omitting definitions to these terms does pose problems. First, from the point of 
view of civil liberties, where some greater degree of clarity of criteria which will determine non-consensual 
treatment and detention is desirable; and second, from the point of view of the courts who must make 
adjudications on this question. The paper points out that the question - What is mental illness? is very 
much a medical convention and such conventions change from time to time. The paper explains that the 
definition of general terms such as illness were avoided when drafting the Bill because they tended to be 
"circular". 
M Durie• 'Te Taha Hinegaro': An Integrated Approach to Mental Health" (1984) Community Mental Health 
in New Zealand, Vol 1, No. 1 : 4. 
C A Roberts "Primary Prevention: to the Present." In C A Roberts edited, Primary Prevention of 
Psychiatric Disorders (University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1969). 
6 
Durie emphasises this point when he says that 4 -
Obviously, not everyone lives in the same reality and notions of mental health are thus 
very much bound by culture and by time. A mentally healthy child living in contemporary 
western society would probably be regarded as disturbed if it lived in the Victorian era. 
A number of commentators have attempted a classification of mental 
health. For example, S Kasi and S Rosenfield5 classify mental health into: 
(a) indices based on treatment data; 
(b) psychiatric signs and symptoms; 
(c) indicators of mood and well being; 
( d) indices of functional effectiveness and role performance; and 
(e) indices derived from notions of positive mental health, for example 
the adequacy of coping mechanisms. 
A pragmatic definition of the term "mental health" for the purposes of this 
paper is framed as follows:6 
A relative state of mind in which a person who is healthy is able to cope with and adjust 
to the recurrent stresses of everyday living in an acceptable way. 
While the 1992 Act does not define the term "mental health" it does 
provide a legal definition of the term mental disorder, 7 the definition of this 
4 M Durie" 'Te Taha Hinengaro': An Integrated Approach To Mental Health", (1984) Community Mental 
Health In New Zealand, Val, No. 1 : 5. 
5 
6 
7 
Cited in H Freeman (Edited) Mental Health and the Environment (Churchill Livingstone, United Kingdom, 
1984): 6. 
Mosby's Medical Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary (Third Edition, CV Mosby and Co., USA, 1990). 
"Mental disorder·, in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous 
or intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or 
cognition, of such a degree that it -
(a) Poses a serious danger to health or safety of that person or of others; or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of him or herself; -
and "mentally disordered", in relation to such a person, has a corre$ponding meaning: .... 
7 
term is the legal threshold over which "potential patients" must be brought 
before they become a "patienf'8 in terms of the 1992 Act. 9 
The definition of the term "Mental Disorder' in the 1992 Act has two 
elements -
(a) qualitative, that is a description of the mental capacities which have 
to be disordered; and 
(b) quantitative, that is the degree to which the disorder must be 
present and its likely consequences. 
The definition also has exclusionary elements set out in section 4 of the 
1992 Act, that is the persons: 
(a) political beliefs; 
(b) religious beliefs; 
(c) cultural beliefs; 
(d) sexual preferences; 
(e) criminal or delinquent behaviour; 
(f) substance abuse; or 
(g) intellectual handicap, 
will not alone lead to compulsory treatment and or detention. 10 
The definition in the 1992 Act is markedly different from the definition of 
the term "mentally disordered' used in the Mental Health Act 1969. The 
definition in the 1969 Act focused on care and protection11 . While the 
8 Section 2 of the 1992 Act refers. 
9 Legal definitions determine entry into the mental health system created by the 1992 Act. They also 
exclude those failing to meet the definitional requirements. 
10 The exclusionary elements would appear to have been included to prevent abuse of compulsory 
psychiatric power. See for example, S Bloch, The Political Misuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, in S 
Bloch and P Chodoff (ed) Psychiatric Ethics, 1981 . 
8 
definition in the 1992 Act places a greater emphasis on danger to self 
and others12. 
(It should be noted that the new definition of the term mental disorder is 
not without some controversy.)13 
This change is in keeping the social and political changes which will be 
identified in this paper. 14 The change represents an "erosion" of the 
theme of "separatism" 15 in New Zealand mental health legislation in 
response to civil liberty concerns, to a minimum level designed to protect 
society's interests in this area. It is also influenced by resource 
constraints faced by the New Zealand "public" health sector. In the 1990's 
state funded long term "total care" is no longer a viable option. 
11 "Mentally disordered" in relation to any person, means suffering from a psychiatric or other disorder, 
whether continuous or episodic, that substantially belongs to one or more of the following classes, namely: 
(a) Mentally ill-that is, requiring care and treatment: 
(b) Mentally infirm-that is, requiring care and treatment by reason of mental infirmity arising from 
age or deterioration of or injury to the brain: 
(c) Mentally subnormal - that is, suffering from subnormality of intelligence as a result of arrested 
or incomplete development of the mind. 
12 Section 2 of the 1992 Act refers. 
13 The Department of Health's User Guide to the 1992 Act suggests that the definition of the term mental 
disorder is narrower than the definition of that term in the Mental Health 1969. Contrast this with the 
perspective of Dr Jeremy Anderson, who was one of the presenters of a New Zealand Law Society 
seminar on the 1992 Act, who suggests that the definition of the term mentally disorder remains broad. 
He also goes on to identify a number of other criticisms he has of the definitions in the 1992 Act: 
14 
15 
"I identify four specific difficulties with the new Act - a difference between the way in which mental 
disorder is defined in the Act and the diagnostic terminology used by psychiatrists; an ambiguous 
approach to the duration of mental disorder; the inclusion of "disorders of volition• that may redefine the 
interface between areas of psychiatric and penal jurisdiction: and the requirement that psychiatrists 
estimate suicidal risk and dangerousness" . 
New Zealand Law Society Seminar, The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992 50-58. 
See pages 15 and 16 of this paper. 
See page 12 and 13 of this paper. 
9 
Mental Health Legislation 
The use of the term "mental health" in mental health legislation can be 
misleading in that the use of the term might suggest that such statutes are 
concerned with the "active" promotion of mental health. 
Mental health acts are not about the promotion of mental health and the 
1992 Act is no exception. These statutes provide a basis for the 
compulsory treatment of the mentally disordered. 16 Stromberg and Stone 
(1983) suggest that mental health statutes have three social functions 17 -
(a) the protection of society ("police power''); 18 
(b) the provision of psychiatric treatment for a patient's "own good' 
(the states "parens patriae" role) ; and 
(c) providing custodial confinement, simply caring for a patients bodily 
needs.19 
As well as considering the functions of mental health statutes, it is also 
important to consider the underlying assumptions on which such statutes 
are based. Namely, that persons suffering from mental disorders -
(a) 
(b) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
frequently fail to recognise their illness and the need for treatment; 
maybe unwilling to accept , or to cooperate, with treatment for their 
condition; and 
The Associate Minister of Health, Katherine O'Regan, said during her speech when moving the second 
reading of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill in the House of 
Representatives-
The Committee (the Social Services Select Committee) agreed that the previous title the - Mental Health 
Bil - was not truly descriptive of the Bil, as it does not deal with the promotion of mental health but only 
with the compulsory assessment and treatment of the mentally disordered. 
Weekty Hansard 34, 12 March 1992: 6861 . 
C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation: 279 - 280. 
It is a "truism" that mentally disorder persons "presenr as a large and severe social problem, lying outside 
the sphere of the criminal law, but seen as a sufficient social and public nuisance to warrant control. 
The third of these functions is not reflected in the 1992 Act. This is because the focus of the 1992 Act 
is on treatment not on the provision of care and protection for patients ('the asylum" function) . 
10 
(c) if left untreated, may pose a threat to themselves or others.20 
Based on these assumptions New Zealand provides a mechanism for the 
"involuntary' assessment and treatment of the "mentally disordered' under 
the 1992 Act. 
THE HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND'S MENTAL HEAL TH 
LEG IS LA TION 
This paper examines the emphasis placed on patient rights by the 1992 
Act. To understand how the 1992 Act came to place this emphasis on 
patient rights we must first turn to history. 
The history of the treatment of the mentally ill has been characterised by 
abuse and neglect. It has only been in the last century that significant 
improvements have been made. 
Curran and Harding summarise the history of mental health legislation in 
this way 21 -
Most of the commitment laws stressing judicial or police involvement were enacted in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Emphasis on formal structures and court review 
continued during the asylum era. The mentally ill and retarded were segregated and 
generally lost their legal capacity and civil rights. Significant changes in treatment 
methods and attitudes towards the mentally ill did not tend to have an effect until the 
middle of the current century. The mental health legislation of many countries was 
significantly revised after 1950. The last two decades have seen more varied and piece 
meal changes in response to the greater complexity of the mental health systems 
themselves and the lesser concentration upon the long term hospitalisation of the 
chronically ill. 
In this quote, Curran and Harding speak of mental health legislation 
generally. Many of the themes which they identify can be traced through 
the development of New Zealand's mental health law. 
20 
21 
The definition of the term "Mental Disorder" in section 2 of the 1992 Act refers. 
W Curran and T Harding The Law and Mental Health: Harmonising Objectives (World Health 
Organisation, Geneva 1978). 
11 
Themes 
There have been a number of important themes in mental health 
legislation in New Zealand. 
A. Separatism. 
Brunton (1985)22 says that the "skeletal structure" of New Zealand's 
mental health law has been separatism. 
The concept of "separatism" in this context rested on the notion that the 
mentally disordered were a separate social problem for which special and 
total care institutions as well as separate laws were needed.23 
Brunton suggests that the differentiation of persons with mental disorder 
as a separate class was an eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
phenomena. He identifies three main factors in this development:24 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The common law acceptance that clinical criteria and behavioural 
deviance, such as a danger to self or others25, were the attributes 
of a mentally disordered person. This acceptance was translated 
into statute by way of the United Kingdom Vagrancy Acts of 1714 
and 17 44 which distinguished "lunatics" from other "social 
undesirables" such as beggars. 
The second factor was the expansion of the notion of "mens rea" in 
criminal law and the expansion of concept of mental disorder to 
cover the criminally insane. 
The last factor is the popular understanding of mental disorder not 
as illness but as madness "a different form of deviance". 
The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985:49. 
The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985: 56. 
The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985: 49. 
Carried over into the 1992 Act with its focus on danger, to self and others, in the definition of the term 
"mentally disordered" in the 1992 Act. 
12 
Because of this tradition of separatism, progress in law reform in this area 
has been slow (mainly because of prevailing social attitudes and the 
common belief that "/unatics"were outcasts). 
Brunton points out that the traditions of separatism can be quite negative. 
These traditions 26 -
(a) impede desirable change in practice of service provision; 
(b) require an undue level or resources to operate; 
(c) impair helpful responses to mental disorder in the community; 
( d) create completely separate mental health services and impede 
progress towards integration; and 
( e) create or reinforce negative attitudes towards mental disorder. 
Though we still have a separate statute dealing with the compulsory 
treatment of the mentally disordered, the writer suggests that the 1992 
Act does go some way to reversing the negative influences of separatism 
in that it: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
26 
27 
28 
"catches up" with new developments in mental health service 
provision (such as the provision of treatment in the community); 
provides for partial integration of mental health services with other 
health services. 'Voluntary patients" for example, are no longer 
dealt with under a separate mental health act; and27 
has attempted to erode "negative attitudes" towards patients who are the 
subject of compulsion, by reinforcing that these patients have rights. 28 
The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985: 57. 
Department of Health records on the implementation of the 1992 Act show that the original Departmental 
drafts of the Mental Health Bill proposed to make amendments to the Area Health Boards Act 1983 rather 
than provide for a separate "Mental Health Act'". This was on the basis of the desirability of integrating 
service provision. This approach would appear to have been rejected on the grounds that it was seen as 
desirable to have a separate mental health statute which was "visible" and because of perceived drafting 
difficulties. 
Part VI of the 1992 Act refers. 
13 
B. Social control. 
This theme is a recognition of the interests of the community in 
compulsory treatment. 
Brunton points to links between the recognition of the mentally disordered 
as a problem group and the steady move towards legislation and 
institutions being used for the purpose of social control in Eighteenth 
Century England. 
It is interesting to note, that the first law on the subject in New Zealand 
was intended "to make provision for the safe custody of and the 
prevention of offences by persons who were dangerously insane". 29 
The writer will demonstrate that this theme continues to be important in 
the context of the 1992 Act. 
C. Legal safe-guards. 
The mechanics of formal admission to psychiatric hospitals are the 
product of what Brunton calls the "save the sane campaign". 
Unlike official intervention for the purpose of public law and order for 
which public institutions were established, private establishments caring 
for the mentally disordered operated on basis of private subscription and 
some medical assessment. Certification was adopted as an early safe-
guard against the detention of persons in the infamous "private" mad 
houses of the Nineteenth Century. The United Kingdom Madhouse Act 
1828 for example, was formulated to meet public concerns about illegal 
detention. 
Procedural safe-guards continue to play an important part in the 1992 
Act. 
29 The Lunatics Ordinance 1846. 
14 
D. State intervention. 
The gradual emergence of collective responsibility for the mentally ill 
arose as much from, humanitarian concerns as from the need to protect 
the sane. Social conscience as much as civil liberty played a part in 
shaping the Mental Health Act 1969. 30 Brunton says that state 
intervention in health and social services in New Zealand is a long 
standing tradition and psychiatric services have played an important part 
in shaping this tradition. 31 
The states influence in this area is reducing. In the 1992 Act, there is a 
greater emphasis on the role of the community in the treatment process. 
The writer also suggests that the on going reforms in New Zealand's 
health sector may "foreshadow" the considerable erosion of the states 
influence in this area. 
WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE 1969 ACT? 
The most recent development in the history of New Zealand's mental 
health legislation is the repeal of the Mental Health Act 1969 and the 
enactment of the 1992 Act. 
From the enactment of the Mental Health Act 1969 through to the 1980's 
major sociological and political changes occurred in New Zealand.32 
These changes stressed the need to reduce the influence of "big" 
government, and focused on individualism and autonomy. 
Mental health law reform in the 1960's was concerned with care and 
protection. This emphasis must be seen in the social and political context 
30 The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985: 54. 
31 The Future of Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Mental Health Law Edited by J Dawson and M 
Abbott, Published by the Mental Health Foundation, September 1985: 54. 
32 See for example, S Maharey "Shaping the Future? Labour, Ideology and Socialism· (1987) Race, Gender 
and Class No. 5 , B Jesson, Behind the Mirror Glass, The Growth of Wealth and Power in New Zealand 
in the Nineteen Eighties (Penguin Books, New Zealand, 1987) and B Jesson, A Ryan and P Spoonly, 
Revival of the Right (Heinman Read, New Zealand, 1986). 
15 
of New Zealand at that time, characterised by economic boom times and 
"the hay day'' of the welfare state and benevolent paternalism. 
Mental health law reform in the 1980's and 1990's must be placed in the 
context of the social and political forces of those decades.33 Economic 
restructuring, accountability and the dismantling of the welfare state were 
amongst the dominant social and political forces. Forces which also 
shaped our views on how mental health services had been provided in the 
past and should be provided in the present. 
In conjunction with these changes the clinical practices of mental health 
providers also changed. A far greater emphasis was placed on treatment 
in the community, made possible with advances in drug and 
psychotherapy. 
At the same time, civil libertarians had turned to champion the cause of 
the mentally ill. John Dawson made the following criticism of the Mental 
Health Act 1969 in 1986 - 34 
The impotence of families; questionable arrest practices without judicial oversight; 
illegible and vague medical certificates; compulsory treatment under a standard which 
specifies the need for detention in a hospital; judicial hearings at which patients are 
excluded from the evidence; the absence of legal advice; a mono-cultural process - these 
findings call into question the strength of our commitment to the rule of law and habeas 
corpus. They indicate the priority given by professionals to committal: the same priority 
given to psychiatric patients through most of our culture - a culture that provides more 
protection for property than for the liberty of it most powerless members. 
The 1969 Act can also be criticised on civil libertarian grounds because it 
did not deal with-
(a) 
(b) 
33 
34 
35 
enormous power imbalances characterising the relationships 
between patients and mental health professionals; 
mental health professionals lack of legal accountability to the public 
for the exercise of their considerable power;35 and 
Also at this time mental hospitals were being transferred from central control to hospital boards and later 
to area health boards. 
J Dawson, Law Research Foundation Seminar, Mental Health a Case for Reform, (1986): 54. 
C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279. 
16 
(c) serious human rights violations which occurred under the old 
system ( such as the circumstances surrounding the death of 
Michael Watene ). 36 
These criticisms together with the growth of health consumerism37and the 
changes in social and political ideology which have taken place in New 
Zealand over the last ten years have led to the greater recognition of the 
rights and autonomy of patients under the 1992 Act. 
THE 1992 ACT 
The 1992 Act a Legal or a Medical Model? 
The 1992 Act is a hybrid (as was the 1969 Act) of legal and medical 
models of mental health statutes. 
A "medical model' conceives of commitment as a process for obtaining 
treatment for persons who psychiatrists diagnose as being mentally ill. 
Under this model legal procedures are secondary to therapeutic concerns. 
The "legal model' on the other hand conceives of commitment as a 
deprivation of liberty in order to protect society from dangerous persons.38 
Shapland and Williams (1983) cite Gostin who suggests that the United 
Kingdom's law reform in this area is a return to "legalism". This reform 
has three main threads -
The right to effective services (entitlements), the protection against 
unjustifiable deprivation of civil and legal rights, and the protection 
against discrimination. 39 
36 J Dawson, "Mental Health Reform", (1986) NZLJ 323. 
37 E Brody "Patient's Rights: Science, Ethics and the Law in International Perspective" (1988) Community 
Mental Health In New Zealand Vol. 4 No. 1 June :21 . 
38 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 282. 
17 
We can see these threads in the fabric of legislation in New Zealand. For 
example, in the: 
(a) "right to treatmenf' set out in section 66 of the 1992 Act; 
(b) provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; and 
(c) protection against discrimination for persons with "psychiatric 
illnesses", set out in the Human Rights Act 1993. 40 
We can find considerable evidence of the prevalence of the "legal model" 
used in the 1992 Act, for example -
(a) the emphasis the definition of the term "mental disorder' places on 
the concept of dangerousness; 41 
(b) the focus on the role of the courts under the 1992 Act; 42 
(c) the increased focus on the "rights" of patients; and 
( d) the increased emphasis on the role of lawyers, epitomised by the 
specific right to legal advice set out in the 1992 Act. 43 
The 1992 Act: A Change in the Tutelary Relationship between Doctors 
and Patients 
Fennell (1992) 44 suggests that important shifts in mental health law are 
those which involve changes in the nature of the "tutelary relationship" . 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
J Shapland and T Williams "Legalism Revived: New Mental Health Legislation in England "(1983) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry Vol. 6: 356-357. 
See the definition of disability in the prohibited grounds of discrimination in section 21 . 
Section 2 of the 1992 Act. 
See for example, section 16, 17, 83 and 84 of the 1992 Act. 
Section 70 of the 1992 Act. 
P Fennell "Balancing Care and Control: Guardianship, Community Treatment Orders and Patient Safe-
guards" (1992) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry Vol. 15 : 205. 
18 
That is, the relationship where patients are under the protection and 
control of a doctor or some other person. 
Fennell identifies three important aspects of the tutelary relationship : 
(1) Care. 
(2) Control. 
(3) Financial support. 
Using the above analysis, the 1992 Act represents a significant change in 
New Zealand Mental Health Law evidenced by a number of "firsts" 
incorporated in the statute including : 
(a) provision for the compulsory review of the medical condition of 
patients under the 1992 Act; 
(b) limited scope to allow patients to consent to treatment and the 
provision of safe-guards where treatment is given and consent is 
overridden; 
(c) review tribunals; 
( d) community treatment orders; and 
( d) an express statement of patient rights in Part VI of the 1992 Act. 
This latter innovation is a clear recognition of New Zealand's intention to 
honour various international human rights conventions. 45 Herr( 1984) 46 
points out there has been a global upsurge in civil and human rights 
expectations in the wake of certain United Nations Declarations. 
In terms of the recent "health reforms" the provisions for the funding of 
mental health services has also changed. This latter change may prove 
to be significant. There is now the possibility that private providers may 
win tenders to provide "compulsory'' mental health services. 
45 For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights {ratified by New Zealand in 1978). 
46 S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care {DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984) :158. 
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Gostin (1987) has highlighted a number of possible difficulties where we 
have private providers providing "compulsory" mental health services. He 
suggests that the private sector produces "an atmosphere of disrespect 
for human rights" 47 for three reasons -
(1) The profit motive. "Private provision" works well where private 
providers are trying to attract voluntary patients to utilise their 
services but not where patients are the subject of compulsion. 
(2) "Private hospitals" are independent of the state and difficult to 
regulate. 
(3) Allowing "private hospitals" to exercise the power of the state by 
providing compulsory assessment and treatment may involve the 
abrogation of a power which is the exclusive prerogative of the 
state. 
PATIENT RIGHTS: PART VI OF THE 1992 ACT 
Granting Rights 
Granting rights to patients suffering from mental disorders is a complex 
business. This is because of the nature of the patients condition and the 
nature of the treatment provided. 
The granting of such rights presupposes that we know what is or should 
constitute psychiatric treatment. It also presupposes that we know and 
can determine what are the influences of psychiatric treatment on the 
patient.48 
47 
48 
L Gostin "Human Rights in Mental Health: A proposal for Five International Standards based on the 
Japanese Experience" (1987) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry Vol. 1 O: 353. 
P Bean and P Mounser, Discharged from Mental Hospitals (MacMillan Press, London, 1993) :127. 
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Definitions 
Rights. 49 A persons entitlements as a member of society, including liberties, such as 
the right to use the public highway, and "claim rights", such as the right to defence 
counsel. "To have a right'' said Mill "is to have something society ought to protect me in 
the possession of. The word "ought'' is important: the language of rights is inescapably 
normative (though the question of what rights are recognised in a particular society are 
straight forwardly factual. 
Bloom and Asher identify four different kinds of rights: 50 
(1) Constitutional rights. 
(2) Common law or fundamental rights. 
(3) Entitlements provided by legislation. 
(4) Rights to be accorded by reason of professional standards. 
The rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act could be seen as 
representing a statutory reframing of certain fundamental rights (which 
have been recognised in psychiatric hospitals for some time). 51 In the 
context of Part VI of the 1992 Act, however, it is more accurate to analyse 
these rights on the basis that they are "entitlements" or "claim rights". 
The majority of the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act are expressed 
to be "entitlements". This means that the rights are not guaranteed 
though patients have the opportunity to claim them. 52 
The 1992 Act can be criticised on the basis that it is "enabling legislation" 
rather than a "guarantee" of rights. Such a guarantee would of course 
require the Government to commit resources to allow patients to claim 
those rights. The writer recognises, that in the context of current 
49 
50 
51 
52 
A Dictionary of PhKosophy (Pan Books, United Kingdom, 1984): 306. 
B Bloom and J Asher Ed. Psychiatric Patient Rights and Patient Advocacy: Issues and Evidence, 
(Human Sciences Press Inc., New York, New York , 1982): 24-25. 
Trapskls Family Law - Vo/ Ill- Mental Health -Protection of Personal Property Rights Act (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington 1992): A-130. 
S Bell, "The Mental Health (Compulsory Treatment and Assessment) Act 1992" (1992) Community 
Mental Health in New Zealand, Vol. 6, No. 2: 16. 
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constraints on health spending such an approach is unlikely to be 
accepted. 
Competency 
In analysing the rights set out under Part VI of the 1992 Act it should be 
noted that the enjoyment of virtually all individual rights is subject to the 
pre-condition, imposed by the law, that an individual must be competent to 
properly exercise those rights. 
In other words, a persons legal competency is used as the measure of 
their ability to exercise certain basic rights. 53 
Patients subject to the 1992 Act are a group who may be perceived as 
lacking: 
(a) autonomy and the ability to exercise rights; and 
(b) the ability to exercise rights with responsibility. 
How can we, therefore, justify the inclusion of specific patient rights in the 
1992 Act? 
Stromberg and Stone 54 make it clear that: 
(a) the evaluation of a person as "mentally disordered" ;or 
(b) the committal of a person for compulsory treatment, 
does not justify denying a patient his or her existing rights 
Caution must be exercised. Mental disorder does not of itself imply an 
inability to discharge rights responsibly. Rights should only be restricted 
on the basis of legal provisions relating to the patients actual competence 
to perform specific functionsss. 
53 
54 
See in this regard the approach taken by Barker J in re S (1992) 1 NZLR 363, 375-75. 
C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation: 279. 
55 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at 364. 
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On the basis of the above analysis a major criticism can be made of the 
1992 Act in that it has no mechanism for grading "patients degree of 
competence" and therefore the patient's ability to exercise specific rights. 
This "flaw' could be partially cured by including a "presumption of 
competence" into the 1992 Act modelled on section 5 of the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 and by having a court make a 
ruling on a patients ability to make use of their rights at the same time as 
making a compulsory treatment order. 
The Express Rights included in the 1992 Act 
The express "rights" set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act are as follows -
A. General rights to information. 56 
This right is the only guaranteed right (guaranteed in that it is expressed 
to be mandatory) set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. 
The right is important as it is the key to "unlocking" the other 
"entitlements" set out in the 1992 Act and provides that every person 
must receive a written statement of his or her rights on becoming a 
patient. 
The 1992 Act defines a "Patient' as a person who is -
(a) required to undergo an assessment interview under section 11 or 
section 13 of the 1992 Act; or 
(b) subject to a compulsory treatment order made under Part II of the 
1992 Act; or 
(c) a special patient. 
It follows that in terms of the 1992 Act there is no need to furnish a written 
statement of rights to a person until the certificate of preliminary 
assessment concerning that person is complete. 
56 Section 64 of the 1992 Act. 
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Prior to that stage, section 23 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
will apply. It follows that a "potential patienf' will have the right to be told 
at the time of their detention of the reason for it. 57 
Section 64 of the 1992 Act makes it clear that once a person becomes a 
"patient" they must be kept informed of the legal consequences of the 
1992 Act and his or her rights of review in terms of the 1992 Act. The 
writer suggests, that as far as possible, information should be provided to 
a patient, pursuant to this right, in a way, at a time and in a setting which 
is conducive to the patient's understanding of the information. 
A clinician should choose the most appropriate time according to the 
patient's mental state thus informing the patient when he/she is not unduly 
distressed and most likely to comprehend58. 
Stromberg and Stone(1983) suggest that: 59 -
Harm could result from administering a long description of legal rights to a agitated, 
frightened patient who, for the next few hours, needs a different kind of therapeutic 
interaction. Thus the model law requires telling a patient his rights "as soon after 
admission as his medical condition permits" .. . This advice should be viewed as a 
therapeutic exchange, an effort to explain to the patient what is occurring and why. The 
dialogue should not degenerate into a routine incantation read from a card, like the 
"Miranda" warning given to persons taken into criminal custody. 
Herr( 1984) suggest that rights notifications should be explained by a 
person well versed in relevant law and social policy to avoid60 "high speed 
mumbled incantations". In North America jurisdictions audio visual aids 
(which are not used in New Zealand) are available which offer self 
instructional guides for patients on rights, responsibilities and decision 
making. 61 
57 Section 23(1 )(a) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
58 Department of Health Review of the Mental Health Act 1969: Discussion Papers, (1984) Review Working 
Party, Department of Health NZ. 
59 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at 323. 
60 S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care (DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984):162. 
61 Project Independence, Social Planning Services INC, "Rights Nowl : A Leaming Programme on Rights 
and Responsibilities" (National Institute of Mental Retardation, Canada). 
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The writer has two criticisms of section 64 of the 1992 Act -
(a) the section does not specify on whom the duty will lie to inform a 
patient of his or her rights as a patient; and 
(b) although the section requires a patient to be given notice of his or 
her rights it does not clearly impose an obligation on the person 
supplying the information to ensure that the patient understands 
the information. 
The Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 could prove a useful supplement to section 64 of 
the 1992 Act. 
In particular, in terms of the 1993 Act, a patient will have the right -
(a) to be informed of the fact of collection of health information 
concerning that patient, the purpose of collection, the intended 
recipients of the information, the consequences of non supply and 
his or her rights regarding access and correction;62 and 
(b) of access to health information concerning his or her assessment 
and treatment. 63 
There are of course a number exceptions to this second right. In this 
context it is suggested that the most important of these is set out in 
section 29(1 )(c) of the Privacy Act 1993. This subsection would allow the 
health agency concerned to withhold information from a patient if the 
release of the information would be likely to prejudice the physical or 
mental health of the patient. 
The writer notes that this sub-section requires the health care provider to 
consult with the patient's usual medical practitioner in this regard. This 
requirement could be problematic as in most cases it is considered that 
the "patient's" responsible clinician is the person most able to judge the 
effect of the release of such information on a patient's physical or mental 
health. 
62 Rule 3 of the Health lnfonnation Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
63 Rule 6 of the Health lnfonnation Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
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B Respect for cultural identity64. 
This "entitlemenf' must be considered in conjunction with section 5 of the 
1992 Act. 
The "entitlemenf' was included in the Mental Health Bill by the Social 
Services Select Committee in response to criticisms of the mono-cultural 
nature of the Bill65. Criticism of the mono-cultural nature of New Zealand 
mental health acts is not new. Criticism of the mono-cultural nature of the 
Mental Health Act 1969 Act was levelled by the "Gallen" lnquiry66; and 
John Dawson. 67 Such criticisms have also led to the recognition of this 
"entitlemenf' in the 1992 Act. 
The "entitlemenf' is an important one. It has been suggested that section 
5 of the 1992 Act will either -68 
(a) be an important relevant consideration in the decision making 
process concerning a patient; or 
(b) have the equivalent status of section 9 of the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, controlling the exercise of all other 
compulsory powers and capable of grounding an injunction when 
there is a direct conflict between a mode of treatment and deeply 
held cultural beliefs. 
A court is unlikely to favour the second option. This is because a court is 
likely to have regard to Parliament's intention in this regard evidenced by 
the general nature of the 1992 Act (imposing as it does compulsory 
treatment). 
64 Section 65 of the 1992 Act. 
65 The submissions from the Mental Health Foundation, the Maori Woman's Welfare League and Pacifica 
refer. 
66 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and Related Matters (1984). 
67 Legal Research Foundation Inc Seminar, Mental Health: A Case For Reform (University of Auckland 
1986). 
68 J Dawson "Mental Health Reform in the Midst of Health Reorganisation", (1992) Council Brief, November: 
6. 
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This "entitlement'' is more likely to be an important consideration when 
considering how the patient is to be treated and how that treatment is to 
be carried out. 
The "entitlement'' cannot be regarded as a "panacea" however as it is 
suggested that cultural barriers, no matter how skilful the expert, will 
continue to impede the attainment of "health". 69 
C. Right to treatment. 70 
Section 66 of the 1992 Act recognises that a patient is entitled to receive 
health care which is appropriate to his or her condition. 
This section does not guarantee the best conceivable treatment, though it 
is suggested that the patient should receive "prompt, competent and 
appropriate treatment". 11 
The section may be used as to exclude those persons from the 1992 Act 
who are incapable of treatment. 
Arguably, this section incorporate a ''treatabilty" criteria into the Act. It would, therefore, 
follow that patients who may not benefit from treatment but who may fall within the 
definition of "mental disorder" because of the inclusion of "disorders of volition" should 
not be made subject to the Act. See Psychiatric Report 1988 (Mason Report) at 224, 'the 
right to treatment only extends to treatable patients'. It does not require that those who 
are not treatable should have treatment forced upon them".72 
The "entitlement'' in section 66 of the 1992 Act is derived from an idea 
well developed in American jurisdictions. 
69 F Varghese "The Racially Different Psychiatrist: Implications for Psychotherapy" Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry (1983), 17:329. 
70 Section 66 of the 1992 Act. 
71 Trapski's FamUy Law - Vol /11- Mental Health -Protection of Personal Property Rights Act (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington 1992): A138. 
72 Trapski's Family Law - Vo/ Ill- Mental Health -Protection of Personal Property Rights Act (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington 1992): A138. 
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In Wyatt v Stickney73, Chief Judge Frank Johnston Junior held patients 
had a remedy for the states "unfulfilled paternalistic responsibility''-74 
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement 
is for humane therapeutic reasons and then to fail to provide adequate treatment violates 
the very fundamentals of due process. 
The origin of this principle in the United States comes from a Federal 
Government model statute. 75 and from an articulation of psychiatric 
patients "rights to treatmenf' in 1960 by Dr Morton Birnbaum.76 
In a wider context this "entitlemenf' is connected with our society's respect 
for the individual, articulated in section 23(5) of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. This is because at the core of the "right to treatment" is 
the idea that treatment must be geared to needs of the individual. 
Herr 77 suggest that a "right to treatmenf' raises four "thorny' questions -78 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Will voluntary patients share in the right to treatment?79 
Are there any settings in which a right to treatment is either 
infeasible or counter productive? 
Resources. How do we best achieve the right in the community 
setting. 
How do you gauge the adequacy of treatment when the patient 
objects. 
325 F Supp 781 (1971) MD Ala): 344 F Supp 373 (1972) (MD Ala) . 
Wyatt v Stickney 325 F Supp 781, 785 (1971) M D Ala). 
Federal Security Agency, "A Draft Act Governing Hospitalisation of the Mentally 111· (Public Health Service 
Publication No. 51 , 1952). 
M Birnbaum "The Right to Treatment" (1960) 46 ABAJ 499. 
S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care (DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984). 
This paper does not attempt to answer these questions. It is suggested that further research could 
usefully be carried out in this area. 
The rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 apply only to "patients· as defined in the 1992 Act and not to 
"voluntary patients·. In New Zealand however, it is arguable all patient have a right to treatment. 
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Quite apart from section 66 of the 1992 Act a "right to treatmenf' is 
available to patients (and arguably to all classes of patients not just those 
who are subject to compulsion under the 1992 Act) from other sources. 
For example, section 151 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides: 
(1) Every one who has charge of another person unable, by reason of detention, 
age, sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to withdraw himself from such charge, and 
unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life, is (whether such charge is 
undertaken by him under any contract or is imposed upon him by law or by reason of his 
unlawful act or otherwise howsoever) under a legal duty to supply that person with the 
necessaries of life, and is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to 
perform such duty if the death of that person is caused, or if his life is endangered or his 
health permanently injured, by such omission. 
(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who, 
without lawful excuse, neglects the duties specified in this section so that the life of the 
person under his charge is endangered or his health permanently injured by such 
neglect. 
The provision of medical care and hospital treatment is included within the 
"necessaries of life"80. 
The writer also notes that medical practitioners have 
An ethical responsibility to render medical services to any person regardless of colour, 
religion, political belief, and regardless of the nature of the illness so long as it lies within 
their limits of expertise as a practitioner. 81 
D. Right to be informed about treatmenf82. 
Successful treatment depends upon a therapeutic alliance between the 
patient and the treating professional. It has been suggested that with 
active participation in the therapeutic process all will benefit. 83 
80 See R v Burney (1958] NZLR 893 and D Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker and Friend Ltd, 
Wellington, 1992) :192- 194. 
81 Article 6 of the New Zealand Medical Associations Code of Ethics. 
82 Section 67 of the 1992 Act. 
83 Department of Health Review of the Mental Health Act 1969: Discussion Papers, (1984) Review Working 
Party, Department of Health NZ. 
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Though the patient may have no say in whether or not to accept 
treatment, it is extremely important to preserve the patient's "entitlemenf' 
to be involved in the therapeutic process. It is the quality of this 
involvement that is important. 
The "entitlemenf' to be informed about treatment may help to remind 
service providers that patients are human beings. This is line with the 
suggestion that the possession of rights enhances the dignity of the 
person who holds the rights and exemplifies our idea of respect for 
people.84 
There is also clinical and empirical evidence to suggest that -85 
(a) a failure to involve patients in treatment decisions can be 
detrimental to their health; and 
(b) a lack of patient involvement increases potential sources of error 
as well as providing an impediment to speedy recuperation and 
beneficial outcomes in the long term. 
It is noted that arguably doctors as a matter of "good medical practice" 
owe this "entitlemenf' to all classes of patient not just to those subject to 
the 1992 Act. Recognition of this "entitlemenf' can be found in doctors 
ethical obligations to -
Accept the right of all patients to know the nature of any illness from which they are 
known to suffer, its probable cause, and the available treatments together with their likely 
benefits and risks.86 
84 Campbell, Justice (MacMillan, London 1988). 
85 Morris (et al) , The Benefits of Providing Information to Patients, Cited by H Teff in the Journal of 
Contemporary Health Law and PoHcy (1993) Volume 9 at 212. 
86 Article 7 of the New Zealand Medical Associations Code of Ethics. 
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E. Further rights in respect of visual or audio recording87. 
Section 68 of the 1992 Act provides that where it is intended to make a 
visual or audio recording of any part of a patient's treatment, the patient is 
entitled to be informed of the fact. No visual or audio recording may be 
made without the consent of the patient or his or her personal 
representative (as defined in section 68(3) of the 1992 Act). 
The genesis of this "entitlemenf' can be found in criticisms such as those 
levelled by "Gallen inquiry'' when commenting upon the manner in which 
photos were taken of Michael Watene while he was being bathed. The 
inquiry suggested to take photos in this way was an affront to human 
dignity.sa 
The Privacy Act 1993 will also have application in conjunction with section 
68 of the 1992 Act. In this context 
"Privacy as a whole or in part, represents the control of transactions between person( s) 
and other( s ), the ultimate aim of which is to enhance autonomy and/or to minimise 
vulnerability. 89 
In particular the following privacy "rules" will apply in respect of the 
collection of health information from patients subject to the 1992 Act: 00 
(a) 
(b) 
87 
88 
89 
9() 
91 
92 
The collection of health information from a patient must be for a 
lawful purpose connected with the functions or activities of the 
health agency concerned; 91 
the health agency concerned ( subject to a number of specified 
exceptions) must collect information directly from the patient. This 
rule emphasises the need for the patient's consent to the collection 
of health information92. 
Section 68 of the 1992 Act. 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and Related Matters (1984). 
Margulkis cited in B Bloom and J Asher Ed, Psychiatric Patient Rights and Patient Advocacy: Issues and 
Evidence, (Human Sciences Press Inc., New York, New York , 1982):175. 
It is recognised that these rights are not unique to patients who are the subject of the 1992 Act and apply 
to all classes of patients. 
Rule 1 of the Health Information Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
Rule 2 of the Health Information Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
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In terms of a patient subject to the 1992 Act a number of 
exceptions to this rule are relevant. These exemptions are set out 
in Rule 2 (2)(b), (c)(i), d(iii), and (e) of the Health Information 
Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) . For example, some patients may 
be incapable of consenting to the collection of health information, 
in which case a substitute authorisation is permitted. It is 
suggested that the onus of proof of patient incapacity in this regard 
will lie with the health agency concerned; 
(c) The patient concerned must be informed of the fact of collection, 
the intended recipients of the information, the consequences of not 
supplying the information and the patient's rights of access to and 
correction of information;93 
(d) 
93 
94 
95 
It is noted that the health agency concerned only needs to take 
such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to inform the 
patient of the above and that the mental capacity of the patient in 
this regard will be relevant. The onus will be on the health agency 
concerned to show that informing the patient of the above 
mentioned requirements is not reasonably practicable. Because 
the health agency concerned must tell the patient of the collection 
of the information at the time of collection, or "as soon as 
practicable there after", the health agency concerned will still have 
a duty to inform the patient as soon as his or her mental state is 
such that the patient is best able to comprehend this disclosure; 94 
and 
Lastly, health information must be collected from the patient in a 
manner which is lawful, fair and with the minimum intrusion 
possible into the personal affairs of the patient. 95 This rule is 
particularly apposite to section 68 of the 1992 Act. This is 
because the taking of a video or audio recording without a patient's 
consent would be regarded as the unfair collection of health 
information. 
Rule 3 of the Health Information Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
See in this regard the comments made on page 24 of this paper concerning the timing of disclosures 
under section 64 of the 1992 Act. 
Rule 4 of the Health Information Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary) refers. 
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F. The right to independent psychiatric advice96• 
Section 69 of the 1992 Act allows the patient to seek consultation from an 
independent psychiatrist and if that psychiatrist agrees to the consultation, 
for access to the patient by that psychiatrist at the patient's request. 
This "entitlemenf' would only seem to be available to those patients with 
sufficient financial resources to afford to avail themselves of it. There is 
no funding for those who cannot. For this reason it is a "paper'' 
"entitlemenf' only. 
Contrast this position with Stromberg and Stone's model law where a 
patient (if he/she is unable to pay) shall have an "entitlemenf' to a state 
funded examination, by an independent psychiatrist, for the purposes of a 
"committal' hearing. 97 
G. Right to seek legal advice.98 
Section 70 of the 1992 Act permits a patient to request a lawyer to advise 
on his or her rights and status as a patient. Where a lawyer agrees to act 
for a patient the lawyer is entitled to access to the patient on request. 
Under the Mental Health Act 1969 there were no restrictions on a patient's 
"entitlemenf' to have access to legal advice. Patients though were 
seldom legally represented. John Dawson reported that in terms of 
hearings under the 1969 Act 2% of patients were legally represented. 99 
It is suggested that this "entitlemenf' may have been included in the 1992 
Act as a reminder to staff, patients and patient's families of the availability 
of legal advice for patients. 
Access to a lawyer could be critical to the ability of patients to understand 
and enforce their rights under the 1992 Act. Though cost again is a 
96 Section 69 of the 1992 Act. 
97 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at 338. 
98 Section 70 of the 1992 Act. 
99 Legal Research Foundation Inc Seminar, Mental Health: A Case For Reform (University of Auckland 
1986). 
33 
consideration. Legal aid will provide only limited help, it would cover the 
costs to the patient of providing counsel during a compulsory treatment 
order hearing but not on any other matters. 100 
As with the "entitlement' to independent psychiatric advice, the 
"entitlement' to legal advice may be illusionary in the absence of proper 
funding for those who cannot afford representation.101 Because of the 
nature of the patient's condition it is possible that some patients may 
make large numbers of capricious requests for advice which could make 
state funded legal advice problematic. The writer considers however that 
such problems could be overcome with suitable controls. 
Some clinicians agree that there is a definite need for access to legal 
services to help to resolve certain socio-economic problems. Access may 
relieve certain anxieties beyond the reach of therapy which may be 
impeding the effectiveness of treatment. 102 
H Right to company and seclusion.103 
Section 71 of the 1992 Act provides that a patient is entitled to the 
company of other persons. A patient can only be placed in seclusion or 
isolation where it is necessary for the care and treatment of that patient or 
the protection of other patients. Seclusion may only be used with the 
concurrence of the responsible clinician. 
A major criticism of this section is that it does not set guide-lines on the 
use of seclusion. The 1992 Act leaves clinical matters such as the use of 
seclusion up to the medical professionals concerned. 
There are other statutory provisions which would control the inappropriate 
use of seclusion. (The use of seclusion for punishment or behaviour 
modification for instance would be inappropriate). To use seclusion in an 
100 
101 
102 
103 
Section 19 of the Legal Services Act 1991 refers. 
Some lawyers are prepared to provide advice on a voluntary basis. The Wellington Community Law 
Centre for example, provides a duty roster for lawyers who are willing to provide patients with legal 
assistance. 
S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care (DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984):79. 
Section 71 of the 1992 Act. 
34 
inappropriate manner could arguably be in breach of sections 9 and 23 
(5) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
I. Right to receive visitors and make telephone calls. 104 
Every patient is entitled, at reasonable times and intervals to receive 
visitors and make telephone calls. This "entitlement' is only limited to the 
extent the responsible clinician considers that such visitors would be 
detrimental to the patient's interests or to his or her treatment. The onus 
is of course on this clinician to demonstrate such detriment. 
The section specifically provides that the power of the responsible 
clinician in this regard is not to abrogate from the "entitlement' of access 
to a lawyer or independent psychiatrist. ios 
It is also suggested that this section places an onus on institutions to 
provide adequate facilities to observe this "entitlement'. 106 
J. Right to receive letters and postal articles.1°7 
A patient is entitled to receive, unopened, any mail addressed to the 
patient. 
There is an exception to this entitlement set out in section 123 of the 1992 
Act. Where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the receipt of 
the letter or article may be detrimental to the patient or his or her 
treatment the responsible clinician may direct that the letter or article be 
opened and if necessary withheld from the patient.108 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Section 72 of the 1992 Act. 
Sections 69 and 70 of the 1992 Act. 
Trapski's Family Law - Vol /11- Mental Health -Protection of Personal Property Rights Act (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington 1992): A 144. 
Section 73 of the 1992 Act. 
If however, the letter or article has been sent by one of categories of persons listed in section 123 (3) of 
the 1992 Act, then that letter or article may not be withheld. 
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Where a letter or article is withheld the responsible clinician has to return 
it to its sender.109 If this is not possible, it must be presented to the 
District Inspector or Official Visitor. 110 The patient should be told that the 
letter or article has been withheld unless it would be detrimental to his or 
her interests or treatment to do so.111 
K. Right to send letters and postal items. 112 
Section 7 4 of the 1992 Act provides that a patient is entitled to have his 
or her out going mail dispatched promptly and unopened. 
In considering this entitlement regard must be had to section 124 of the 
1992 Act. This section provides that any letter sent by a patient may be 
held if -
(a) sending the letter would be detrimental to the patient's 
interests (but the item may not be held is addressed to one of the 
categories of person set out in section 123(3) of the 1992 Act); or 
(b) if the addressee (including the categories of person set out 
in section 123(3) of the 1992 Act) has notified the hospital that he 
or she does not want to receive mail from the patient. 
Any mail which is withheld must be produced for the District Inspector or 
Official Visitor113 and the patient must be told that the mail has been held 
unless it is detrimental to the patient's interests or treatment to do so.114 
Are the Rights Set Out in Part VI of the 1992 Act "Unique" to "Patients" 
The rights in Part VI of the 1992 Act are not unique to "patients" as 
defined in the 1992 Act. The rights set out in sections 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
Section 125(1 )(a) of the 1992 Act. 
Section 125(1)(b) of the 1992Act. 
Section 123(1) of the 1992 Act refers. 
Section 7 4 of the 1992 Act. 
Section 125(2) of the 1992 Act. 
Section 125(3) of the 1992 Act refers. 
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and 70 of the 1992 Act are arguably available to all categories of patient. 
The rights set out in sections 64, 71, 72, 73 and 74 of the 1992 Act are 
more relevant to "patients" under the 1992 Act as a class, though are not 
"peculiar'' to that class. 
As we have seen the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act are not new 
or unique. These rights represent a statutory re-framing of certain 
fundamental rights. 115 The question must be asked therefore, "why did 
the legislature incorporate a re-statement of these rights in Part VI of the 
1992 Acr? 
We can identify a number of reasons for the inclusion of these rights-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
115 
116 
117 
118 
to honour various human rights conventions to which New Zealand 
is a signatory; 116 
to "break down" the negative influences of "separatism" and the 
idea that the mentally disordered are "outcasts". 117 The "re-
statemenf' of the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act can be 
seen as an attempt to erode negative attitudes towards patients by 
setting out statutory expressions of the value of patients as 
"people" with rights; 
to help combat the problem, in terms of therapy of how to deal with 
the need for compulsory treatment {particularly where such 
treatment requires the patient to be "detained' as an in-patient) 
while at the same time maintaining the patients sense of autonomy 
and freedom which is important to the therapeutic response and the 
therapeutic alliance; and 
As a statutory "reminder'' that patients have rights. This "reminder" 
is required because research has shown that violations of rights 
are judged less unfair where the victim is judged "abnormal". 116 
See page 21 of this paper. 
See page 19 of this paper. 
See pages 12 and 13 of this paper. 
P White "Judgments of Abnormality and their Consequences for Judgments of Infractions of Human and 
Civil Rights" (1989) Community Mental Health in New Zealand Vol.4, No.2:72. Also see the comments on 
pages 59 and 60 of this paper. 
37 
CIVIL LIBERTY V COMPULSORY TREATMENT 
When considering the civil rights of patients in terms of the 1992 Act we 
must not lose sight of the objects of the social task at hand. In this 
respect the 1992 Act represents a "trade off' of civil liberty for social 
protection. 
Compulsory Treatment 
In the 1992 Act a judgment has been made as to the circumstances when 
compulsory treatment will be imposed on a person. 119 In those 
circumstances it has been decided that it is justifiable to override a 
number of the patient's civil liberties and impose compulsory treatment on 
the patient. During the second reading of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Bill, Helen Clark put it this way120 -
The Bill will not please everyone because it draws a line. It draws a line between the 
rights of people with serious mental disorder and the rights of the community that might 
be disturbed by them. The explanatory note of the original Bill set out the "central 
dilemma" the law has to deal with in this area. It expresses it this way: " .. . in what 
circumstances should a civilised society insist on treating a mentally disordered citizen 
who is incapable of giving consent or, worse still, is capable of giving consent but refuses 
to do so?" In a nut shell this is the problem. 
The underlying assumption behind this judgement is that -
119 
120 
121 
Mental illness creates a variety of problems for the community as well as for families of 
the mentally ill. Mentally ill persons may be a nuisance in the community and may 
disrupt normal social activities; they may be dangerous or frightening. They may be so 
depressed, disorientated, or deluded that their presence in the community poses serious 
risks to their own health and welfare. A person with a psychotic depression may be a 
serious suicide risk, and persons suffering from extreme states of agitation and confusion 
may undertake actions which seriously harm their own and their families welfare. Public 
policies have developed from removing mentally ill persons considered dangerous from 
the community and providing them with treatment or custody. 121 
This judgment places just as much emphasis on the rights of patient's families and the community as 
upon the benefits treatment may bring to a patient. 
WeekJy Hansard 34, 12 March 1992: 6864. 
D Mechanic, Mental Health and Social PoVcy (3 ed Prentice Hall Inc, New Jersey 1989). 
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We can find a number of examples of the recognition of the rights of the 
community and of patient's families or whanau in the 1992 Act, these 
include -
(a) the emphasis the definition of the term "Mental disorder' used in 
the 1992 Act places upon "serious danger to the health or 
safety ... of others" 122 It follows that the 1992 Act is likely to be 
invoked where a person's abnormal state of mind impacts on some 
one close to them for example a close family member; 
(b) the right of any person to make an application for assessment of 
another under section 8 of the 1992 Act; 
(c) the right of the patient's principle care-giver to be sent a copy of 
the-
(d) 
122 
123 
124 
125 
(i) certificate of preliminarily assessment under section 
10(4)(a) of the 1992 Act; 
(ii) certificate of further assessment under section 10(5) 
of the 1992 Act; and 
(iii) certificate of final assessment under section 14( 4 )(b) 
of the 1992 Act, 
(The patient's principle care-giver also has the right to be present 
through out a compulsory treatment order hearing 123and has the 
right to be heard at that hearing, whether in person or through legal 
counsel1 24); 
the assistance available to care-givers from Duly Authorised 
Officers under the 1992 Act125 ; and 
Section 2 of the 1992 Act refers. 
Section 19(6) of the 1992 Act. 
Section 20(3) of the 1992 Act refers. 
See in this regard sections 37, 38, 39, and 40 of the 1992 Act. The position of "Duly Authorised Officer" 
was added to the Mental Health Bill by the Social Services Select Committee after received submissions 
from the Schizophrenia Fellowship and the National Council of Women on the question. 
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(e) the manner in which people are "committed'. John Dawson found 
that under the 1969 Act: 53% of "committal' applications came from 
family applications; 14% from police and social agencies (probably 
at bequest of families); and 26% from the staff in general or 
psychiatric hospitals.126 
How do you Balance the "Competing Rights" of Patients and of the 
Community: The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative 
One mechanism for achieving the balance between the civil rights of 
patients and the wider interests of the community is the "least restrictive 
alternative principle". 
This principle is not a right of itself. It is a safeguard on the exercise of 
rights, and only the most basic rights: those which fall under the rubric of 
fundamental rights. Such rights can only be restricted to the extent 
necessary to carry out a valid purpose. 127 
The principle is often used as a test for accommodating potentially 
conflicting civil liberties and therapeutic interests and as such is pertinent 
in terms of the scope of the 1992 Act. 
The principle has found statutory expression in section 8 of the Protection 
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. It could be argued that such 
statutory expression could usefully be repeated in the 1992 Act as a 
guide to balancing the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act with wider 
interests. 
The writer would argue however, that there is an implied "least restrictive 
alterative principle" set out in common law. 128 
126 
127 
128 
Legal Research Foundation Inc Seminar, Mental Health: A Case For Reform (University of Auckland 
1986) : 19. 
S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care (DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984):79-87. 
Though it would seem that the "balance" in terms of the application of the principle in this regard is tipped 
in favour of the individual patient. 
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For example in Mitchell v Allen1'29 Woodhouse J said of the Mental Health 
Act 1969: 
On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the protection is merely one facet of a 
powerful statute and that the statute itself contains the clearest evidence of an intention 
that there will be no peremptory or indiscriminate interference with personal freedom. 
Obviously, it is of fundamental importance that whenever the Mental Health Act is 
invoked to detain a man against his will, a high degree of care must be exercised to see 
that the facts of the case are within the strict boundaries which the Act defines. 
While society's interests in terms of the 1992 Act are important they are 
not absolute. The 1992 Act does not authorise the "preventive detention" 
of patients. To illustrate this point, commentators have pointed out that 
the coercive and highly intrusive measures set out in the 1992 Act 
represent -130 
An exceptional concession to the normal powers of the state. In the context of this 
legislation such measures should not be employed unless the prospect of therapeutic 
success is significantly greater than the detriment to the patient conceived in terms of 
loss of liberty and the right to self determination. 
Clause 18 (f) of the Health and Disability Services Commissioner Bill may 
provide a statutory mechanisms to further "tip" the right to "the least 
restrictive alternative" in the patient's favour. 
Clause 18(f) provides for the inclusion in the Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumer Rights to be promulgated under the Bill of: 
The duties of health care providers and disability service providers to provide services in 
a manner that respects the dignity and independence of the individual. 
(Emphasis added.) 
1 '29 (1969) NZLR 110, 113. 
130 Trapski's Family Law - Vo/ Ill- Mental Health -Protection of Personal Property Rights Act (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington 1992): A-11 . 
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DUTIES 
Logically the presence of express patient rights in the 1992 Act implies 
the existence of correlative duties. 
To ascertain with whom such duties may lie it is necessary to look at the 
roles of the various main "players" in terms of the 1992 Act. 
The Responsible Clinician 
Responsible clinicians are responsible for the overall management of a 
patient's condition in terms of the 1992 Act. 
Though the 1992 Act does not specify "on whom" the duty to provide 
access to the various rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act lies, it is 
reasonable to assume (given the correlation between the nature of these 
rights and the patient's treatment) that the responsible clinician will have a 
prominent role.131 
District Inspectors and Official Visitors 
District Inspectors and Official Visitors are responsible for investigating 
breaches of patient rights under the 1992 Act. 
Section 75(1) of the 1992 Act provides that where a complaint is made 
by, or, on behalf of a patient about a breach of a right the matter shall be 
referred to a District Inspector or Official Visitor for investigation. 
Section 75(2) requires the District Inspector or Official Visitor to talk to the 
patient and/or complainant and everyone else involved in the case and to 
generally investigate the matter. 
Where the District Inspector/Official Visitor considers that the complaint 
has substance he or she must report the matter to the relevant Director of 
131 It is also suggested that the service provider concerned whether it be a (Crown Health Enterprises or 
otherwise) should be regarded as having a duty to provide patient access to the rights set ou1 in Part VI of 
the 1992Act. 
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Area Mental Health Services together with such recommendations as he 
or she thinks fit. 
In terms of section 75(3) of the Act, they must also report their findings to 
the patient. 
Directors of Area Mental Health Services 
After receipt of a report from a District Inspector or Official Visitor in 
respect of an alleged breach of a patient's right(s) under Part VI of the 
1992 Act, the Director of Area Mental Health Services is required to "take 
such steps which are necessary to rectify the matter''.132 
While the Act leaves the decision of "what steps are necessary" up to the 
discretion of a Director, the writer suggests that the manner in which this 
discretion is exercised can be the subject of judicial oversight ( on an 
application for judicial review of the Director's decision in this regard). 
Review Tribunals 
Review Tribunals have an important role in terms of "patient rights" . This 
is because they have a role in investigating whether the rights of patients 
have been denied or breached, where the patient ( or the complainant 
where this is not the patient) consider that they are not satisfied with the 
outcome of their complaint. 133 
Role of Lawyers and Clinicians 
Lawyers 
The expression of patient rights in Part VI of the 1992 Act relies heavily 
on legal interpretations of rights being devised by lawyers with legal 
definitions in mind. 
132 Section 75(2) of the 1992 Act refers. 
133 Section 75( 4) of the 1992 Act refers. 
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It relies upon patients and others defining their rights according to the law 
and seeking professional legal assistance when those rights are violated. 
It also relies upon the active involvement of lawyers willing to take up the 
patients cause. For this reasons lawyers have a crucial role in terms of 
the attainment of the rights set out in the 1992 Act. 134 
The importance of the role of lawyers in terms of the 1992 Act, may be 
further emphasised because of the strength of criticisms levelled at 
psychiatry. Psychiatry attracts more criticism than any other branch of the 
medical profession. One reason for this is that psychiatrists often treat 
their patients without their patient's consent135. Psychiatry is especially 
vulnerable to charges of infringement of patient's rights because its ability 
to predict the outcomes of ( compulsory) therapy is less than other 
branches of medicine.136 
Lawyers v Clinicians? 
Some commentators argue that clinicians and lawyers have diametrically 
opposed "roles" in terms of the "civil liberty v compulsory therapy' conflict. 
Bean (1988) points out that law and psychiatry stem from different 
epistemological traditions 131_ 
One emphasises the rational self determination of the individual, the other the 
deterministic nature and effect of the disease condition. One starts from the assumption 
that legal rules protect patients from arbitrary decisions, the other that rules inhibit and 
restrict treatments. 
Analogous changes to the 1992 Act have been criticised in other 
jurisdictions by psychiatrists who contend that the new standards are 
detrimental to their therapeutic role.138 
134 
135 
136 
137. 
138 
P Bean, Mental Disorder and Social Control (2ed University Press, Cambridge, 1988):188. 
J K Mason and R A McCall-Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (Butterworths, London, 1988). 
E Brody "Patient's Rights: Science, Ethics and the Law in International Perspective" (1988) Community 
Mental Health In New Zealand Vol. 4 No. 1 June :21 . 
P Bean, Mental Disorder and Social Control (2ed University Press, Cambridge, 1988):167. 
The Mental Health (Compulsory Treatment and Assessment) Act , Community Mental Health in New 
Zealand Vol. 6, No. 2 August 1992 , 16. 
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This criticism is on the basis that : 
(a) the process of assessment and treatment of patients is a clinicians 
expertise; 
(b) the diagnosis of mental disorder is a clinical decision; 
(c) the adversarial approach within the judicial process is incompatible 
with the clinical process; and 
( d) that the continued participation of the legal system within the 
clinical process continues to undermine the validity of the clinicians 
expertise. 
The writer does not agree that we can necessarily assume that lawyers 
and clinicians will always be on "opposite sides" in debates on patient 
rights. The writer suggests that the clinicians role in protecting the "rights" 
of the patient cannot be understated. Because the clinicians primary 
allegiance is to the patient, the clinician has a need to respect the rights 
of the patient as a "sign-post" to the carrying out of their professional and 
ethical responsibilities. 
The Role of the Judiciary: Section 84 of the 1992 Act 
Greig J has said that the purpose of the High Courts jurisdiction in terms 
of the Mental Health Act: -139 
... is to provide additional protection and an additional safeguard to those who may be 
detained or kept in a mental hospital. It is an important supervisory function of the Court 
and is a statutory expression of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to maintain a 
protective and supervisory function over those who are under a disability. It partakes to 
some extent of the application of the jurisdiction in habeas corpus .... 
The effectiveness of the Court in this regard will depend very much on the 
expertise of the Judge concerned. 
139 Re M unreported. 21 April 1986 H C Wellington M716/85:15. 
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John Dawson reported 140 that under the Mental Health Act 1969, few 
judges had the forensic skills to expose medical evidence to close 
scrutiny and in practice medical witnesses were likely to be the main 
decision makers. 
There are mechanisms available to Judges exercising this jurisdiction 
under the 1992 Act to ensure that the evidence of clinicians, responsible 
for the patient's care, is the subject of close scrutiny. The Court has the 
power to summon medical and other witnesses to testify in respect of the 
matter and has the option of requesting that a Review Tribunal provide a 
report.141 
To conclude, in terms of the 1992 Act the "responsible clinician" and the 
service provider142 are the persons with whom the duty will lie to provide 
patients with their rights under Part VI of the 1992 Act. The review 
tribunal and the High Court have a "supervisory role" in this regard and 
lawyers have an all important role as advocates of patient rights. 
HOW CAN PATIENTS CLAIM THEIR RIGHTS 
If a right is to be a positivist right we could contend that there is no right 
unless there is the power to secure the performance of that right. There 
are many different facets of this idea, though power may only come from 
coercive sanction to enforce a correlative duty in the 1992 Act. 
There are a number of different "coercive sanctions" which may be 
available to ensure patients rights under the 1992 Act are respected. 
A. Internal Mechanisms 
Section 75 of the 1992 Act provides "an internal mechanism" for handling 
complaints in respect of breaches of patient rights. The section has one 
important limitation in that it only applies to those rights set out in Part VI 
140 
141 
142 
Legal Research Foundation Inc Seminar, Mental Health: A Case For Reform (University of Auckland 
1986) :41 . 
Section 84(7) of the 1992 Act refers. 
Whether Crown Health Enterprise or otherwise. 
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of the 1992 Act and so is of no assistance in respect of complaints of 
breaches of any rights which may be contained in other parts of the 1992 
Act. 
The mechanism can be criticised because it may "lack teeth". It is not 
clear from the provisions of the 1992 Act, what coercive power a Director 
of Area Mental Health Services may have to "rectify (a) matter'' where 
there has been a breach of a patient's rights. 143 
While in most cases it is anticipated that service providers will comply with 
a recommendation to rectify a breach of a patient's rights, made by a 
Director of Area Mental Health Services, in more serious cases, an ability 
to impose punitive sanction may help to ensure compliance. 
A suggested sanction which could usefully be incorporated into the 1992 
Act is as follows:144 
... 2. Any person who takes into custody, admits for evaluation, detains for a further 
period of time, discharges, or administers medication or treatment to a patient, or takes 
other actions affecting the substantial rights of a patient, doing so knowingly and willingly 
in substantial violation of this Act, shall be subject to a civil fine, and shall be liable for 
injunctive relief and money damages, in addition to any other liability under the law. This 
paragraph shall not be invoked in cases of minor, merely technical, or otherwise 
justifiable breaches of the provisions of this Act. 
The option of recommending the imposition of this sanction could be 
made by a Director of Area Mental Health Services to a Court which would 
make the final determination as to whether to impose a sanction. 
B. The Parens Patriae Jurisdiction of the High Court 
An obvious avenue of complaint for a patient complaining of a breach of 
his or her rights under the 1992 Act would be to make an application to 
the High Court to ask that the Court exercise its "Parens Patriae" powers 
to rectify the situation. 
143 
144 
Section 75(2) of the 1992 Act refers. 
C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at: 394. 
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The Parens Patriae jurisdiction of the High Court is set out in section 17 of 
the Judicature Act which provides -
The Court shall also have within New Zealand all the jurisdiction and control over the 
persons and estates of ... idiots, [mentally disordered persons], and persons of unsound 
mind, and over the .. . [managers] of such persons and estates respectively, as the Lord 
Chancellor of England, or any Judge or Judges of [Her Majesty's] Court of Appeal, so far 
as the same may be applicable to the circumstances of New Zealand, has or have in 
England under the Sign-Manual of [Her Majesty] or otherwise. 
The Parens Patriae jurisdiction is the expression of the Crown's duty to 
protect the sovereign's subjects and in particular those subjects who 
cannot look after themselves. 
Lord Eldon in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1 at p 20 said -
This jurisdiction is founded on the obvious necessity that the law should place 
somewhere the care of individuals who cannot take care of themselves, particularly in 
cases where it is feared that some care should be thrown around them. 145 
Doubt has however been cast on the continued existence of this 
jurisdiction in the case of in Re H. 146 In Re H, Inglis J discusses the 
exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Courts. 147 Inglis J points 
out that it was thought that even though the jurisdiction was lost in the 
United Kingdom, when it was revoked contemporaneously with the 
passing of comprehensive mental health legislation, there was evidence 
that the jurisdiction survived in New Zealand. 148 
Inglis J suggests that this latter view has been overtaken by the decision 
of Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)149 where it was held (apparently for 
the first time in the United Kingdom) that the Warrant was revoked and 
145 
146 
147 
148 
Cited in D Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992): 104. 
[1993) NZFLR 225, 228-29. 
In the United Kingdom the jurisdiction was assigned by Warrant under the Sign Manual to the Lord 
Chancellor and the Chancery Judges. In New Zealand it was assigned to Judges of the High Court under 
section 17 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
For example in Re P (A Mental Patient)[1961) NZLR 1028 and Re R (A protected Patient) [197 4) 1 NZLR 
339 (CA) and is also evidenced by the fact that In the Mental Health Bill there was provision for the repeal 
of section 17 of the Judicature act 1908 though it was decided to "retain" the jurisdiction and not repeal 
the section in the 1992 Act. 
149 2 AC 1. 
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that its resurrection depended upon the legislature not the courts. Inglis J 
suggests that the wording of the Judicature Act 1908 in the present tense 
does not seem apt to assign a jurisdiction deliberately withdrawn 30 years 
ago to Judges appointed in New Zealand since 1960. 
To put the continued existence of the parens patriae jurisdiction beyond 
doubt it is suggested that the High Court should address the question, or 
alternatively, that the legislature expressly resurrect the jurisdiction by 
way of an appropriate statutory amendment. 150 
C. Offences 
The offence provisions in the 1992 Act could provide a safeguard to 
ensure that patient's rights are respected. 
Section 114 of the 1992 Act provides that the intentional neglect or ill-
treatment of mentally disordered persons by any person concerned with 
their oversight, care or control is an offence. This section, could for 
example, operate to ensure "the right to treatment' set out in section 66 of 
the 1992 Act is respected.151 
D. Public Law Remedies 
The 1992 Act lies within the wider field of public law. The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 may be especially relevant to considerations of the 
application of the 1992 Act to patient rights (as those acting under the 
1992 Act exercise wide statutory powers with important consequences for 
the liberty of patients). 
The courts have provided some guidance on how the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 will be applied to the 1992 Act. 
150 
151 
Such and amendment could be modelled on section 9(3) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
Section 151 of the Crimes Act 1961 will also be relevant. 
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Gallen J in Re M said152 -
The provisions of the Mental Health Act (1969) continue to apply regardless of the 
passing of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, but they are to be interpreted as far as 
possible in the light of [it] and it may well be that earlier interpretations may no longer be 
appropriate". 
Patients interests in liberty and fair procedure (and in the interpretation of 
their rights) may now be given a higher priority than previously in the 
committal process. 153 It is suggested that where the 1992 Act confers a 
wide discretionary power, which may infringe a right under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, such powers should be interpreted as if 
they were subject to the implied limit "but not so as to infringe the rights in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1992''. 154 
Application can also be made by patients for judicial review of the 
exercise of statutory powers affecting their rights. The remedies available 
to a successful patient would of course be public law ones. A writ of 
mandamus could be used for example to ensure that a Director of Area 
Mental Health Services takes all necessary steps to rectify any breach of 
a patient right set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. 155 
Some commentators also suggest, 156 that because of the way the way 
rights and entitlements are specifically set out in the 1992 Act, they may 
be enforceable in the Courts in the same way that the right to obtain 
official information has been held to be enforceable in the Courts. 157 
152 [1992] 1 NZLR 29, 40. 
153 J Dawson, J Anderson and S McCarthy, New Zealand Law Society Seminar "The Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, (1993) February-March. 
154 McClean, Rishworth and Taggart, Law Research Foundation Seminar The Impact of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights on Adrrwnistrative Law (1992): 73. 
155 Section 75(2) of the 1992 Act refers. 
156 J Dawson, J Anderson and S McCarthy, New Zealand Law Society Seminar "The Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, (1993) February-March. 
157 Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman [1988] 1 NZLR 385. 
50 
E. Disciplinary Proceedings 
Another possible source of sanction for a breach of a patient's rights 
would be disciplinary proceedings against any medical professionals 
involved. 158 
F. The Privacy Act 1993 
A complaint may be made under the Privacy Act 1993 where a patient 
alleges that any action is or appears to be an "interference with the 
privacy of an individua/'159. Section 66 of the 1993 Act sets out, for the 
purpose of the complaints mechanism created by the 1993 Act, the 
circumstances under which an action will amount to "an interference with 
the privacy of an individual'. 
Of most relevance to a patient in terms of the 1992 Act, is the fact that a 
complaint may be based on the violation of one of the information privacy 
rules set out in the Health Information Privacy Code 1993 (Temporary). 
As is discussed elsewhere in this paper, there is considerable scope for a 
patient under the 1992 Act to use the code in addition to his or her rights 
under Part VI of the 1992 Act. 160 
Once a patient establishes that an information privacy rule had been 
breached, before the matter will be regarded as an "interference with the 
privacy of an individual' the Privacy Commissioner or the Complaints 
Tribunal constituted under the 1993 Act must be of the opinion that the 
breach has -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
158 
159 
160 
161 
caused or may cause loss, detriment, or damage to the individual 
concerned; or 
adversely affected or may adversely affect the rights, benefits and 
privileges of that individual; or 
resulted in or may result in significant humiliation, significant loss of 
dignity, or significant injuries to the feeling of that individual. 161 
The Health and Disability Commissioner Bill will also be relevant in this regard if it is enacted. 
It must be noted that a number of the complaints procedures in respect of the 1993 Act do not come into 
force until 1 July 1996, see section 79 of the 1993 Act. 
See pages 25, 31 and 32 of this paper. 
Section 66(1 )(b) of the Privacy Act 1993 refers. 
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In terms of the requirements set out above, the patient who wishes to 
establish that the conduct complained of amounts to "interference with the 
privacy of an individual' (for the purposes of section 66 of the 1993 Act) 
has a high threshold to overcome. 
Any person may bring a complaint alleging that an action or decision is or 
appears to be, an "interference with the privacy of an individuaf' . It follows 
that a patient's lawyer, a family member, a district inspector or some other 
person could bring a complaint. 162 
A complaint would not necessarily need to be made before the Privacy 
Commissioner will become involved. There is provision in the 1993 Act to 
enable the Privacy Commissioner to avoid being completely complaints 
driven. If complaints of a certain type continue to arise or concerns were 
raised in respect of practices in the mental health area, the Commissioner 
may choose to exercise his or her power to investigate the matter of his or 
her own volition. 163 The Commissioner's ability to investigate complaints 
"pro-actively" is particularly important if you consider the nature of the 
conditions suffered by the mentally ill. 
The Privacy Commissioner has two particular functions in relation to 
complaints 164-
1. To investigate. 
2. To act as a mediator to attempt to reach a settlement. 
In respect of this second function the Privacy Commissioner has the 
power to call compulsory conferences. 165 The purpose of such a 
conference is to identify the matters in dispute and to try to reach a 
162 
163 
164 
165 
Section 67 of the 1993 Act refers. 
Section 13(1 )(m) of the 1993 Act refers. 
Section 71 of the 1993 Act provides that the Privacy Commissioner has a discretion whether to act on an 
complaint. The Commissioner may decide to take no action where there is an adequate remedy or right of 
appeal available to the person in respect of whom the privacy violation has occurred. In the case of a 
patient under the 1992 Act there is a complaints mechanism set out in section 75 available in respect of 
violations of the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. 
Section 76 of the 1993 Act refers. 
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resolution of the dispute166. If a dispute cannot be resolved, there is the 
possibility that the Privacy Commissioner may refer the matter to the 
Proceedings Commissioner for action before the Complaints Review 
Tribunal. 167 
The Proceedings Commissioner can bring "class actions". 168 This power 
may prove to be important in respect of patients in terms of the 1992 Act. 
The Commissioner may take an action for instance on behalf of all the 
patients in a particular institution or region, or in respect of a number of 
institutions or regions, where mental health service providers are acting in 
a way that constituted an "interference with the privacy of individuals" in 
their care. 
The Complaints Review Tribunal set up by the 1993 Act is empowered to 
grant a number of remedies in respect of proven instances of "interference 
with the privacy of an individual' . The remedies which may be awarded 
are set out in section 85 of the 1993 Act. One of the remedies available is 
provision for damages. Section 88 of the 1993 Act goes on to set out the 
circumstances where damages are available under the 1993 Act and the 
maximum quantum of those damages. 
To conclude, as we have seen, there are arguably a number of "coercive 
sanctions" available to patients to ensure that their "rights" in terms of the 
Part VI of the 1992 Act are delivered. The existence of the "coercive 
sanctions" outlined above does not, however, "guarantee" that these 
sanctions will be used. 
166 
167 
168 
The compulsory conference power is based on the pre-hearing conferences in the Protection of Personal 
and Property Rights Act 1988. 
Section 83 of the 1993 provides that aggrieved individuals can bring an action to the Complaints Review 
Tribunal themselves where the Privacy or Proceedings Commissioners have declined to act. 
Section 82(4) of the 1993 Act refers. 
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LAW LIBRARY 
VICTO!llA U~~IVER;:,ITY Of WELLINGTON 
HELPING PATIENTS CLAIM THEIR RIGHTS 
Rights are not self-executing. 
Mental health patients because of the nature of their condition, may in 
particular be: 
(a) unaware of their rights; or 
(b) unable to assert their rights. 
The statement of rights in Part VI of the 1992 Act does not include 
guarantees that these rights will automatically be implemented and 
enforced. The mechanism for implementation and enforcement is 
advocacy. 
Advocacy can be defined as a means of defending, promoting or pleading 
a cause on behalf of another. It can also be defined as169 -
A device for increasing pressure against the social structure to achieve social equity and 
justice. 
The two definitions, set out above, illustrate the fact that there are two 
types of advocacy -
(1.) Service advocacy which looks after patients interests on a case by 
case basis. 
(2.) Policy advocacy which provides advocacy for patients generally as 
a class. 
In terms of the 1992 Act, District Inspectors and Official Visitors fulfil a 
limited "advocacy role". Though the role of these officials in this regard 
can be seen as more analogous to an ombudsman than to an advocate. 170 
169 
170 
N V Lourie cited in B Bloom and J Asher Ed. Psychiatric Patient Rights and Patient Advocacy: Issues 
and Evidence, (Human Sciences Press Inc., New York, New York , 1982): 25 
In terms of section 75 of the 1992 Act, District Inspectors and Official Visitors are responsible for 
investigating complaints regarding the alleged breach of patient rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. 
In this role District Inspectors and Official Visitors are not responsible for the "implementation or 
enforcemenr of patient's rights. Their role is to investigate, and to report on the results of their 
investigations (together with such recommendations as they think frt) to the relevant Director of Area 
Mental Health Services. 
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At the time of the enactment of the 1992 Act there was pressure to 
include specific provision to provide patients with access to patient 
advocates other than legal practitioners. 171 This pressure seems to have 
been resisted because of the possibility of the enactment of the Health 
Commissioner Bill. 172 
While the role of lawyers, as advocates for patients under the 1992 Act 
cannot be understated, 173 it cannot be assumed that lawyers will make the 
best advocates for patients in all circumstances. 
It is important to recognise that many problems faced by patients are not 
of a legal nature and that short lengths of stay in hospital may constrain 
traditional legal strategies. In some cases a mediating fact finding and 
counselling posture is often preferable to litigation in resolving patient's 
problems.174 There is also some evidence to suggest that: 
(a) lawyers lack experience in dealing with patient clinical issues; 
and175 
(b) an over emphasis on formal and legal procedures by lawyers can 
prove to be a barrier to the effectiveness of patient advocacy.176 
Research has shown that advocacy has proven most successful in areas 
covering such matters as reviewing patient medication and behaviour 
management177, a role for which lawyers may not be well qualified. 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
See the Report Back of the Mental Health Bill to the House of Representatives by the Social Services 
Select Committee, Hansard (1989): 13602-13605. 
In recent months there have been indications that this Bill may soon be enacted. A Supplementary Order 
Paper has recently been referred to the Select Committee considering the Bill. This Supplementary Order 
Paper proposes major changes to the Bill. 
See the comments on page 43 and 44 of this paper. 
C D Stromberg and A Stone • A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at: 387. 
For example clinical issues involving the right to treatment in section 66 of the 1992 Act. 
G Bridgman "Does Aavocacy Work7' (1992) Community Mental Health in New Zealand Vol 6. No. 2: 16. 
G Bridgman "Does Aavocacy Work7' (1992) Community Mental Health in New Zealand Vol 6. No. 2: 16. 
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The Health and Disability Commissioner Bill (incorporating proposed 
amendments from a Supplementary Order Paper of Tuesday 3 August 
1993). 
The Health and Disability Commissioner Bill could provide patients under 
the 1992 Act with access to advocacy services in a limited range of 
circumstances. 
The Bill provides for the appointment of a Health and Disability 
Commissioner who will investigate complaints against person or bodies 
that provide health and/or Disability Services. 
The Commissioner will also have general functions in respect of the 
protection of the rights of health and disability services consumers as set 
out in the Bill. 
The Bill also sets up a Health and Disability Consumer Advocacy service 
and provides for the promulgation of a Code of Health and Disability 
Consumer's Rights. 
This Code of Rights is central to the Bill. 178 The functions of the Health 
and Disability Services Commissioner and the Health and Disability 
Services Consumer Advocates established by the Bill are closely related 
to the terms of the Code. For instance the functions of the Commissioner 
and advocates in regard to complaints relate to complaints in respect of 
breaches of the Code. 
If patients under the 1992 Act wish to avail themselves of the Bill's 
advocacy mechanisms in respect of their "rights" (in terms of Part VI of 
the 1992 Act) such services may only be available where the "righf' which 
is claimed corresponds to a "righf' protected by the provisions of the 
Code. 
The Code of Rights as such will not be promulgated until the enactment of 
the Health and Disability Commissioner Bill. It is possible to gauge the 
scope of the provisions which may be included in the Code by considering 
Clause 18 of the Bill which sets out matters which must be included in the 
Code. 
178 The Code is to be drafted by the Health and Disability Services Commissioner and then forwarded to the 
Minister of Health. There is a mechanism in clause 64 of the Bill to give the code "legal force" by 
promulgating the code as regulations. 
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There is some overlap between the provisions of clause 18 of the Bill and 
the rights of patients set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. For example, 
Clause 18(c) of the Bill overlaps with sections 5 and 65 of the 1992 Act. 
The sub-clause provides that the Code shall include provisions relating to 
rights of health and disability services consumers and the duties of 
providers of those services as they relate to -
(iv) The provision of services that take into account the needs, values, and beliefs of 
different cultural, religious, social and ethnic groups ... 
Solving Problems "In- House" 
As well as external advocacy mechanisms, some commentators suggest 
that there is a need for internal procedures for the resolution of 
grievances at treatment facilities. For example, Stromberg and Stone's 
model law provides119 -
Every treatment facility shall establish a fundamentally fair procedure for the assertion, resolution, and 
redress of patient's grievances, and shall have a patient's representative or similar person who shall hear 
patient's grievances, attempt to solve problems, and protect the patient's interests.180 
There is arguably scope in Clause 18(e) of the Health and Disability 
Services Commissioner Bill to require health and disability services 
providers (including providers of mental health services) to establish 
internal complaints mechanisms. 
Clause 18 (e) of the Bill provides for: 
The establishment and maintenance, by health care providers and disability service 
providers, of procedures for dealing with complaints against them by health consumers 
179 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally ur (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at: 385-386. 
180 Stromberg and Stone point out that the proponents of an external advocacy model stress the importance; 
(a) of advocate independence; 
(b) an adversarial system; and 
(c) legally enforceable remedies. 
While proponents of an internal system of dispute resolution argue that more can be achieved through 
conciliation and administrative reform. 
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or disability services consumers, or both, and access by health consumers and disability 
services consumers to such procedures. 
There is empirical evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness and 
advantages of an such a system. Krajewski and Bell (1992), 181 report that 
such a system run by the Maryland Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (to serve patients hospitalised in 12 state institutions) resolved 
the vast majority of patient complaints through mediation between patients 
and clinical staff. 
The system in question uses two "tiers". The first tier is a four level 
appeal program which attempts to resolve grievances through mediation 
between patients and staff. At all stages during this first tier the patient's 
interests are represented by a "patient's rights adviser" (most of whom are 
social workers or former nurses). 
At the first level of the resident grievance system, the rights adviser investigates the 
allegation and tries to resolve the grievance through mediation that usually involves the 
patient's treating physician. If the grievance cannot be satisfactorily resolved, it proceeds 
to the second level of the system, in which mediation typically involves the clinicians 
supervisor or the medical director of the facility. At stage three, the grievance is heard by 
the facilities rights committee, which includes patients, family members, staff and 
representatives of patient advocacy groups in the community. This committee makes 
recommendations for resolution of the complaint to the chief executive officer of the 
hospital, who can elect to implement the recommendations or take alternative action to 
resolve the grievance. The fourth and final stage of the resident grievance system is a 
hearing before the cental review committee of the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene .... Any grievance that is not resolved by the resident grievance committee 
moves to the second tier of the advocacy system, referral to a legal service provider 
under contract to the state of Maryland. The legal service provider represents the 
patient's interests in presenting the grievance to the state court. 182 
Clinicians in the facilities in question supported the system because they 
perceived that most complaints in the system are resolved in a therapeutic 
and non-adversarial way. 183 
181 
182 
183 
T Krajewski and C Bell "A System for Patient's Rights Advocacy in State Psychiatric In-Patient Facilities 
in Mary/am!' (1992) Hospital and Community Psychiatry, Vol. 43, No. 2 :127. 
T Krajewski and C Bell "A System for Patient's Rights Advocacy in State Psychiatlic In-Patient Facilities 
in Maryland' (1992) Hospital and Community Psychiatry, Vol. 43, No. 2 :128. 
T Krajewski and C Bell "A System for Patient's Rights Advocacy in State Psychiatlic In-Patient Facilities 
in Maryland' (1992) Hospital and Community Psychiatry, Vol. 43, No. 2 :129. 
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This system could not be used in New Zealand because of the provisions 
of section 75 (1) of the 1992 Act. 184 The writer suggests that appropriate 
statutory amendments should be made to allow for mediation of patient 
rights complaints in appropriate cases under the 1992 Act. Such a 
system could prove to be simple cost effective and provide a "transparent 
mechanism" for the resolution of patient's complaints in respect of 
breaches of their rights under Part VI of the 1992 Act.185 
BARRIERS TO PATIENTS CLAIMING THEIR RIGHTS 
The provision of advocacy services for patients under the 1992 Act is 
doubly important because of the fact that there are a number of barriers 
which may hinder a patient in claiming his or her rights under the 1992 
Act. 
To effectively "deliver'' patient rights we must be aware of these barriers 
and overcome them. 
A. Labels 
Person suffering from mental disorder are more than most in need of special protection 
to protect their civil rights. Their disabilities frequently of themselves prevent them from 
looking after their own interests, and because of the nature of the illness from which they 
suffer, their complaints are likely to be either not taken seriously or substantially 
discounted.186 
White (1989) suggests that because the mentally ill are not regraded as 
"normal' infringements of "their rights" are often not regarded as a breach 
of rights. People make a categorical distinction in their beliefs between 
normality (or mental health) and abnormality (or mental disorder). When 
an individual or group is regarded as normal, part of what that means is 
184 
185 
186 
The 1992 Act requires that all complaints made in respect of breaches of patient's rights must be referred 
to a district inspector or official visitor. 
Or, in deed in respect of any other grievance a patient may have. 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and Related Matters (1 984) 
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that they are implicitly endowed with a set of rights, privileges 
responsibilities and duties.187 
Persons judged as abnormal on the other hand, will not as a result be 
endowed with that same set of rights, privileges and duties. The result is 
that if such a person is a victim of, what in other circumstance would be, a 
violation of rights that violation might not be seen as unfair by those who 
judge it. It might even not be considered a rights violation at all because 
the victim may be seen as having no rights in the first place. 
This situation occurs because of the relationship between characteristics 
and rights. 188 A normal adult because of the characteristics of normality, 
is judged as able to exercise rights and privileges in a responsible way. 189 
The justification for withholding rights and privileges is that the group from 
which they are withheld would not or could not use them responsibly 
because they have those characteristics which lead them to be judged 
abnormal. 
Evidence of this attitude can be found in the reasoning of Barker J in Re 
S. 190 In that case the Judge suggested that the right to refuse treatment in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 did not apply to "committed' 
patients. This was because, the phrase "everyone" in section 11 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 only applies to those persons who 
were competent to consent. 
This decision has been the subject of criticism. 191 
As we have seen 192 caution must be exercised in this area. To repeat a 
point made earlier, mental disorder does not of itself imply an inability to 
discharge rights responsibly. Rights should only be restricted on the 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
P White "Judgments of Abnormality and their Consequences for Judgments of Infractions of Human and 
Civil Rights" (1989) Community Mental Health in New Zealand Vol. 4, No. 2: 72. 
P White • Judgments of Abnormality and their Consequences for Judgments of Infractions of Human and 
Civil Rights" (1989) Community Mental Health in New Zealand Vol. 4, No. 2: 72. 
Responsibilities go with rights and they are accorded to those who are judged able to use them 
reasonably. 
[1992) 1 NZLR 363, 374-75. 
G Austin "Righting a Child's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act and the Gillick Competent Child (1992) 7 otago LR 578, 582. 
Page 22 and 23 of this paper. 
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basis of legal provisions relating to the patients actual competence to 
perform specific functions.193 
B. The Balance of Power 
A major barrier to patients claiming their "rights" is that the "balance of 
power' in the physician patient relationship is very much in favour of the 
physician. Physicians are seen as knowledgeable, responsible and 
rational while of course the patient is not. The onus very much lies on the 
patient to show that he or she is rationale or aware until proven otherwise. 
One manifestation of this "balance of power'' is that patients are very 
much on the back foot when it comes to taking legal action against 
psychiatrists. Klien and Glover194 point out that psychiatrists are trained 
to deal with their patients hostility and this helps them to forestall 
threatened law suits. 
C. Resource Barriers 
Resource barriers may hinder patients in claiming their rights under the 
1992 Act. 
It is important to recognise that the underprivileged, including the mentally 
ill, may have difficulty in gaining access to justice. Obstruction to such 
access will include the cost of litigation, and hiring a lawyer. 195 
D. Lack of Knowledge 
Hoyer (1986) quotes a Danish Study which concluded that patient's lack 
of knowledge about their rights was substantial. 196 
193 C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at 364. 
194 
195 
196 
Klien and Glover 1983 "Psychiatric Malpractice" International Journal of Law Psychiatry Vol 6 No. 2 131-
57. 
See the comments on page 33 and 34 of this paper. 
The study also showed that patients in general hospitals had more knowledge about their rights than 
patients with mental disorders. 
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Hoyer suggests that the main reason for mental health patients inability to 
use their existing rights is a lack of information about their rights and a 
lack of knowledge of the complaints procedure to be followed. 
On a general level he points out the following paradox -
(a) compulsory detained patients are regarded as disturbed so that it is 
justified to deprive them of their personal freedom; 
(b) on the other hand legal rights are established for patients to make 
use of. 
The procedures to make use of rights are complicated and to make use of 
them a certain amount of knowledge is presupposed. It is questionable 
then, to what extent such patients can take part in this complex process. 
Hoyer also points out that there are other barriers which need to be 
overcome by patients in order to make contact with officially appointed 
bodies who will uphold their rights, the clients behaviour and the manner 
of communication are important in this context.197 
E. The Nature of the Patient's Condition. 
A Patient's condition may be a major barrier to his or her articulating 
complaints in respect of alleged breaches of rights. 
It has been suggested that they may prove to be difficult clients for those 
who would seek to advocate their rights because: 198 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
197 
they may be mute, voluntarily or otherwise; 
they may be suffering from physical incapacity caused by 
medication; 
they may be ambivalent to attempts to provide assistance; 
G Hoyer • Compulsory Admitted Patients Ability to Make Use of their Legal Rights· (1986) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry: 413. 
198 J Dawson, J Anderson and S McCarthy, New Zealand Law Society Seminar "The Mental Heal
th 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, (1993) February-March: 39. 
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( d) they may be openly threatening; 
( e) they may be suicidal; and 
(f) they may be paranoid. 
Overcoming barriers 
The most important factor in overcoming the barriers set out above, is 
clearly the availability to patients of appropriately trained advocates. 199 
Because of patients ignorance or ambivalence towards their rights and 
because their complaints may be difficult to check, it is also suggested 
that further measures may be needed. 
For instance, a mandatory reporting regime, to apply in respect of the 
violation of patient rights, could be incorporated into the 1992 Act. The 
advantages of this scheme would be that where a patient was unwilling or 
unable to complain of a breach of his or her rights another person would 
be required to make a complaint on his or her behalf. Such a scheme has 
precedents. In an number of US states there is a legal duty to report 
cruel, maltreatment and abuse of the mentally ill.200 
WHAT CAN THE RIGHTS APPROACH ACHIEVE? 
There are no specific assessment structures either: 
(a) built into the 1992 Act; or 
(b) designed to accompany the 1992 Act, 
for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the rights approach, 
manifested in Part VI of the 1992 Act. It is only possible therefore, to 
199 
200 
See pages 54 to 59 of this paper for a discussion on advocacy. 
S Herr, S Arons and R Wallace Jnr. Legal Rights and Mental Health Care (DC Health and Co. USA, 
1984). 
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make general comments on the usefulness of the rights set out in Part VI 
of the 1992 Act. 
It can be suggested that the rights in the 1992 Act may help to restore 
something which patients lose when they enter the "mental health 
system", that is some degree of independence: 
Independence is associated with full adult status and is highly valued. The definition of 
those peripheral groups as dependant, therefore, also labels them as people of low 
status , and must inevitably undermine their self-esteem, and teach them implicitly, that 
they have never achieved, or have fallen from full adult status, and all the rights, 
privileges and respect that status attracts. 201 
It has also been suggested that the possession of rights enhances the 
dignity of the person who holds the rights and exemplifies our idea of 
respect for people. 202 
Incorporating legally enforceable rights into legislation and advising 
treatment staff, patients and the public that those rights must be respected 
also helps ensure that civil commitment will actually advance therapeutic 
and protective goals. 203 
The writer suggests that other advantages of a rights based approach 
are:204 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
201 
202 
203 
204 
to promote a belief that patients are more than an aggregate of 
their symptoms; 
to create the impression that patients are neither wholly insane or 
wholly sane but in the midst of their insanity can be presumed to be 
capable of making decisions; and 
to protect the "patients" self and essential humanity. 
J Rowland and R McKinley "Caring, Curing and Controlling: An Outsiders Look at Life and Work in New 
Zealand Psychiatric Hospitals" (1985), Department of Health. 
Campbell , Justice (MacMillan, London 1988). 
C D Stromberg and A Stone "A Model State Law on CMI Commitment of the Mentally Ill" (1983) 20 
Havard Journal of Legislation 279 at: 283. 
See the comments made on page 37 of this paper. 
64 
From a different perspective, Bean (1993) suggests that as a method of 
prompting change rights may have a limited use. On one hand rights can 
improve the patients perception of him or herself and prevent intrusion, 
though he points out that they rarely promote new, more humane, or more 
effective methods of treatment. 205 
Bean suggests the reason for this is that patients rights and patients care 
stem from different sources. One source takes the view that man should 
be protected from those who care for him because they may be prone to 
abuse him. The other source, the view that patient care deals with the 
whole person and requires direct intervention in all aspects of his or her 
life.206 
AREAS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
The writer recognises that a number of issues dealt with in this paper 
require further detailed examination, these include: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
205 
206 
a detailed discussion of the "fate" of the High Court's "parens 
patriae" jurisdiction; 
an examination of the relationship between the 1992 Act and the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act in its final form; 
an examination of how in practice the complaints procedures in the 
Privacy Act 1993 will apply to patients under the 1992 Act; 
the practical need for and desirability of, an internal "transparent" 
dispute resolution mechanism in mental health services; 
The "rights based approach" does not go beyond the legal level and consider other important issues such 
as-
(a) issues connected with the quality, care and proper funding of mental health services; 
(b) provision of property trained and motivated staff; 
(c) questions of the day to day management of the patient and any problems these may bring. 
The first view can be traced to a Kantian view that paternalism is the greater evil, or to Mill where the 
sovereignty of the individual is paramount. The second view can be traced to the idea that mental disorder 
is debilitating and that to cure the patient is an ethnically justifiable task. 
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( e) the practical need for mandatory reporting of rights violations; and 
(f) thorough research into and assessment of the effectiveness of the 
rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act as they pertain to individual 
cases. 
(g) the position of "special' and "restricted" patients under the 1992 
Act, and the application of patient rights to "in" and "ouf' 
patients. '207 
CONCLUSION 
In th is paper the writer has undertaken a critical analysis of the rights set 
out in Part VI of the 1992 Act. This analysis has been placed in social 
and political context of New Zealand in the 1980's and 1990's. 
The paper has considered the origins of the rights set out in Part VI of the 
1992 Act and has examined why the rights in question were included in 
the 1992 Act. In this context the paper has: 
(a) examined the fact that the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act 
are not unique to patients in terms of that Act; 
(b) concluded, that those rights set out in Part VI were available to 
patients before the 1992 Act came into force; and 
(c) offers explanations why the 1992 Act included a "restatement" of 
existing rights. 
The social task of the 1992 Act has been considered by examining the 
"central dilemma" of any mental health statute, the civil tiberty v 
compulsory treatment conflict. From this examination, the writer has 
concluded that any mental health statute must involve a "trade off' of 
patient's rights for the rights of others, such as the community. 
The duties to provide the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act have 
been reviewed and conclusions drawn as to where such duties lie. 
'207 It is recognised that the rights set out in Part VI of the 1992 Act have most application to "in-patients". 
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The sanctions available to ensure that patient's rights are respected have 
been examined and suggestions made concerning the need to provide 
"teeth" to the procedures set out in section 75 of the 1992 Act. 
The paper has examined the barriers which exist to patient's attaining 
their rights and the means of overcoming these barriers. Finally, the 
paper has conducted a general evaluation of the "rights" approach in the 
1992 Act. The writer has drawn conclusions as to what, in practical terms, 
the inclusion of the patient rights in Part VI of the 1992 Act can achieve 
for patients. 
To conclude, it must be remembered that at the heart of the legal reform 
movement promoting patients rights is the fundamental vision that 
patients under the 1992 Act should be able to satisfy their basic need for 
treatment without sacrificing their basic rights. It must also be stressed, 
that if patients are to have access to their basic rights they must also have 
access to the means of attaining those rights. 
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